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NO. 32 AUGUST 2018 Introduction 
Chemical Weapons Attacks: 
The End of Anonymity 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to Identify Perpetrators 
Oliver Meier 
On 27 June 2018, the majority of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) States Parties 
adopted a decision to expand the mandate of the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The additional tasks include providing information on 
who is using chemical weapons in Syria. The decision was adopted by majority vote. It 
paves the way for The Hague-based organisation to later identify or, at least, create the 
conditions for the identification of those responsible for chemical weapons attacks. It 
also strengthens chemical weapons control because the OPCW will now hopefully be 
able make reliable statements on who is responsible for the continuing use of chemi-
cal weapons. However, it also risks politicising the Technical Secretariat and is likely 
to further complicate preparations for the CWC’s Fourth Review Conference, taking 
place from 21–30 November 2018. 
 
On 29 May 2018, the United Kingdom, with 
the support of ten other states (including 
Germany), requested a Special Session of 
the Conference of CWC States Parties. Lon-
don argued that treaty member states “have 
a responsibility to act” in the face of blatant 
violations of the prohibition of chemical 
weapons. 
Chemical warfare agents have not only 
been used since 2012 in the Syrian civil war 
but also more recently in politically moti-
vated attacks on individuals. For example, 
the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim 
Jong Un was assassinated on 13 February 
2017 at Kuala Lumpur airport with the VX 
nerve agent. 
Then, on 4 March 2018, former Russian 
spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia 
were poisoned in Salisbury, United King-
dom by a substance belonging to the family 
of Novichok agents. London accuses Russia 
of being responsible for the attack. The Ger-
man government, as well as other Western 
partners, also consider it very likely that 
Russia was the perpetrator. 
Then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson 
made it clear that the United Kingdom 
wanted a decision to be adopted that would 
allow the OPCW to identify those responsi-
ble for future chemical weapons attacks. 
Johnson called on all “right-thinking states” 
to support the initiative. Russia and Iran 
were highly critical of the proposal. They 
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accused London of wanting to “politicise” 
the work of the OPCW and argued that 
expanding its tasks was neither useful nor 
necessary. 
Violations of Norms against the 
Use of Chemical Weapons 
The dispute over chemical weapons attacks 
has divided the international community 
since 2012. At that time, reports of chemi-
cal weapons use in the Syrian civil war were 
becoming more frequent. On 21 August 
2013, hundreds of people died in a sarin 
attack on opposition-controlled Ghouta, 
near Damascus. In September 2013, Syria 
joined the CWC under pressure from the 
United States and Russia, and against the 
background of the threat of Western mili-
tary strikes. In an unprecedented multi-
lateral operation, participating states re-
moved and destroyed around 1,300 tons of 
chemical warfare agents from the country. 
However, this did not prevent further 
chemical weapons attacks in Syria. It is 
presumed that such weapons have been 
used at least several dozen times since 
2012. There is increasing evidence that 
Damascus has submitted declarations on its 
chemical weapons programme that were 
neither correct nor complete. In a climate 
of deteriorating relations between Russia 
and the West, opinions are also sharply 
divided on chemical weapons use. 
Western states believe the Syrian armed 
forces are responsible for most of the chemi-
cal weapons attacks in Syria. Russia and 
Iran, on the other hand, question Syria’s 
alleged involvement, pointing among other 
things to the successful disarmament of 
Syria’s declared warfare agents. Moscow 
also stresses that the Islamic State has used 
chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq and 
should, therefore, be considered a suspect 
in other cases, too. From the outset, this 
dispute over responsibility has complicated 
the work of those international mecha-
nisms and bodies charged with the task of 
investigating chemical weapons attacks. 
In 2014, the Director-General of the 
OPCW established a Fact Finding Mission 
(FFM) to investigate alleged chemical weap-
ons attacks in Syria. The FFM is still ongoing, 
but its aim is merely to clarify whether 
chemical weapons have been used. The in-
spectors will not comment on the question 
of culpability. 
From 2015, identifying those responsible 
for alleged chemical weapons attacks was 
the job of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative 
Mechanism (JIM), established by the United 
Nations Security Council. It submitted sev-
eral reports attributing in four cases respon-
sibility to the Syrian regime and proving in 
two cases that the Islamic State has used 
mustard gas. 
However, Russia, Syria and Iran have 
consistently criticised JIM reports as being 
biased. In November 2017, while the politi-
cal conflict was heating up, Russia vetoed 
an extension of the JIM’s mandate. At the 
same time, the West did not support Mos-
cow’s proposals to establish an investigative 
mechanism that would have had a mandate 
beyond Syria. Since then, there has no 
longer been an independent, international 
investigative mechanism to implement the 
JIM’s mandate to “identify, to the greatest 
extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups 
or governments who were perpetrators, 
organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved 
in the use of chemicals as weapons” in 
Syria. 
Expanding the OPCW Mandate 
Against this background and referring 
specifically to the Russian veto preventing 
a renewal of the JIM mandate, the United 
Kingdom submitted a request on 29 May 
2018 to convene a Special Session of the 
CWC’s Conference of States Parties. Shortly 
thereafter, London received the support it 
required to carry the motion from more 
than 64 states. 
The British government sent the initial 
draft of the decision to CWC States Parties 
on 13 June. The text was substantially 
revised after the British government had 
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consulted a number of other states. The 
revised draft was distributed on 22 June. 
Given Russia’s harsh criticism of the 
West’s approach, it was clear that a consen-
sus decision by the 152 delegations accred-
ited at the Special Session in The Hague 
was unlikely. As soon as the meeting had 
begun, Russia, Iran and Syria tried to delay 
the decision-making process with procedur-
al tricks. There followed a controversial 
debate between Western supporters of an 
expanded mandate and its opponents, in 
particular, the three states mentioned 
above. 
The decision was finally adopted on 
27 June by a majority of 82 to 24 votes 
(with 26 abstentions which counted as votes 
not cast). Thus, the required two-thirds 
majority was achieved. Voting at the OPCW 
is unusual as CWC States Parties generally 
adopt decisions by consensus. Never before 
had such radical change to OPCW proce-
dures been decided by a majority vote. 
The decision has two main parts. As far 
as Syria is concerned, it is the job of the 
OPCW Technical Secretariat to identify 
those responsible for chemical weapons 
attacks in the country “by identifying and 
reporting on all information potentially 
relevant to the origin of those chemical 
weapons in those instances in which the 
[FFM] determines or has determined that 
use or likely use occurred”. Investigations 
are further limited to cases for which the 
JIM has not issued a report. As provided for 
in the CWC, the Executive Council, in cases 
of particular gravity and urgency, may refer 
the issue directly to the United Nations 
General Assembly or Security Council.  
The second part goes beyond Syria. States 
Parties affirm that “whenever a chemical 
weapons use occurs on the territory of a 
State Party, those who were the perpetra-
tors, organisers, sponsors or otherwise in-
volved should be identified”. CWC mem-
bers note that the Technical Secretariat has 
an added value because it can conduct in-
dependent investigations “with a view to 
facilitating universal attribution of all 
chemical weapons attacks”. 
In this context, the States Parties autho-
rise the Director-General to provide techni-
cal assistance to a state as part of a request 
for assistance following a chemical weap-
ons attack. The objective is to identify those 
responsible for the attack. The Technical 
Secretariat can also enlist the assistance of 
external experts with relevant experience. 
The States Parties request the Director-
General to prepare proposals for the next 
regular Conference of the Parties in Novem-
ber 2018 as to how such an “independent, 
impartial” group of experts could be estab-
lished. They also ask the Director-General 
to develop general proposals on how to 
improve implementation of the OPCW veri-
fication regime and strengthen the capabili-
ty of the Technical Secretariat. This is im-
portant because expanding the tasks of the 
OPCW is likely to require additional fund-
ing for personnel and technical equipment. 
An Important Step forward – with 
Possible Side Effects 
The decision adopted by OPCW Member 
States strengthens the prohibition of chemi-
cal weapons because it creates better oppor-
tunities to identify those responsible for 
chemical weapons attacks. The OPCW is 
responsible for investigations into respon-
sibility first for Syria, and later possibly for 
other chemical weapons attacks. As a re-
sult, evidence will be gathered indepen-
dently of the UN Security Council. This 
procedure circumvents a potential veto by 
one of the permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council. Proponents of the decision are 
thus aiming to restrict the influence of Rus-
sia and its allies in Syria on the investiga-
tions. 
The decision is logical because the OPCW 
is the international body best qualified to 
investigate chemical weapons attacks. The 
organisation is responsible for monitoring 
the implementation of the CWC. It is the 
only multilateral organisation competent 
to globally investigate chemical weapons 
attacks at short notice. Nearly half of its 
450 employees work in departments deal-
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ing with verification. The CWC contains 
elaborate rules and procedures for conduct-
ing chemical weapons inspections. The 
OPCW cooperates with a worldwide net-
work of certified laboratories to analyse 
samples. In addition, the CWC has global 
reach with 193 member states and, there-
fore, covers more than 98% of the world’s 
population. Consequently, the OPCW in-
vestigation reports are the gold standard 
when it comes to independent and techni-
cally robust chemical weapons analysis. 
In future, the OPCW will also make its 
findings available to other international 
investigations. The decision specifically 
refers to the “International, Impartial and 
Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to assist in 
the Investigation and Prosecution of those 
Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes 
under International Law committed in the 
Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011”. 
The UN General Assembly established the 
IIIM in December 2016. As its long name 
suggests, the IIIM’s primary purpose is to 
gather information in preparation for 
prosecuting war crimes and human rights 
violations committed in Syria. 
Identifying the culprits of chemical 
weapons attacks is a necessary, but insuf-
ficient condition for strengthening the 
CWC’s norm against the use of such weap-
ons. Three challenges need to be tackled for 
the decision to achieve its desired effect. 
“After detection – what?” 
Firstly, it is not merely a question of identi-
fying those responsible for violating the 
CWC but also of holding them accountable. 
This problem of sanctioning violations of 
international (arms control) agreements is 
as old as it is difficult to solve. Back in 
1961, at the beginning of the modern arms 
control era, political scientist and later 
Director of the US’s Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Fred Iklé, posed the 
question, “After detection – what?”. Iklé, 
who was thinking mainly about arms con-
trol between the superpowers, described a 
key issue of arms control: which (potential) 
violator voluntarily joins an international 
agreement that includes provisions which 
could lead to its own punishment? Iklé 
proposed creating a permanent agency to 
evaluate relevant information. It was to 
depoliticise, as much as possible, procedures 
for assessing compliance and deciding on 
sanctioning. Iklé’s description back then to 
some degree captures the current role of 
the OPCW. 
Like nearly all other multilateral regimes, 
the CWC tries to solve the ‘compliance’ 
problem by strictly separating information 
collection and evaluation. The Technical 
Secretariat is responsible for collecting 
relevant data, while evaluation (at least so 
far) has fallen within the remit of political 
decision-making bodies. In the case of the 
CWC, these are the Executive Council and 
the Conference of the States Parties. In par-
ticularly serious cases, they may involve the 
UN General Assembly or UN Security Coun-
cil. This is precisely what the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Gov-
ernors did when it referred Iran and North 
Korea to the UN Security Council for violat-
ing their safeguards obligations. 
The decision adopted in The Hague refers 
explicitly to relevant CWC rules and proce-
dures. However, in expanding the OPCW’s 
mandate, the question as to what will 
happen once the OPCW has identified and 
named a perpetrator becomes even more 
poignant. Although the Conference of the 
States Parties may recommend “collective 
measures to States Parties in conformity 
with international law”, the Security Coun-
cil is still responsible for enforcement. How-
ever, known political blockades in the Coun-
cil are likely to prevent effective sanctions. 
This also reduces the likelihood that 
OPCW reports may become a basis for in-
vestigations by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). According to the ICC’s Rome 
Statute, “[e]mploying asphyxiating, poison-
ous or other gases, and all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices” is a war crime. 
Syria has not signed the Rome Statute but 
the Security Council can refer war crimes 
committed in non-states parties to the ICC. 
Since Russia has so far prevented such a 
decision, the path to prosecution is likely 
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to remain blocked. As a result, individual 
crimes may only be prosecuted extraterrito-
rially, as is being attempted in Germany. 
One hopes that the offending party 
would correct its behaviour to avoid being 
stigmatised as a treaty violator. However, 
experiences in Syria suggest that (the threat 
of) “naming and shaming” is unlikely to be 
a sufficient incentive to ensure compliance. 
Syria and Russia have repeatedly denied 
responsibility, sometimes with questionable 
arguments, even in those cases where 
Damascus has been identified as the per-
petrator. 
One last option to respond to violations 
of treaty obligations and to attempt to 
enforce compliance would be for those 
states which support OPCW investigation 
results to impose political, economic or 
military sanctions by themselves. The ex-
pulsion of more than 150 Russian diplo-
mats by Western states in response to the 
Salisbury attack is an example of such an 
approach. Another example would be the 
US military strikes against Syria, launched 
two days after the use of sarin on 4 April 
2017 in Khan Shaykhun. The JIM later 
named Syrian forces as the perpetrators of 
the poison gas attack on this city. 
One week after chemical weapons had 
been used in Douma near Damascus on 
7 April 2018, France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States jointly attacked Syria. 
Their goals were to retaliate, to degrade the 
Syrian chemical weapons programme and 
to deter the perpetrators from launching 
additional chemical weapons attacks. 
In both these cases, military action could 
not be justified by the findings of interna-
tional investigations charged with identify-
ing the perpetrators. However, once the 
OPCW has the responsibility and capability 
to identify those responsible for chemical 
weapons attacks, this could change. 
The expansion of the OPCW mandate 
could also increase pressure on Germany 
to impose military sanctions against the 
convicted perpetrators of chemical weapons 
attacks. In particular, France wants stronger 
responses, including military strikes, to 
deter the use of chemical weapons. For ex-
ample, French President Emmanuel Macron 
has repeatedly threatened rapid military 
strikes in cases where those responsible for 
chemical weapons attacks can be identified. 
The German government described the 
military action in April 2018 as ‘necessary 
and appropriate’. In contrast, the Bundes-
tag’s Research Service suggested that the 
attacks did not conform to international 
law. 
Politicising the 
Technical Secretariat 
Secondly, extending the role of OPCW 
inspectors runs the risk of further politicis-
ing the work of the Technical Secretariat. 
OPCW and IAEA carefully protect the politi-
cal independence of their inspectorates 
which they see as a precious asset. When 
verification takes place in highly political 
environments, such as in Syria or in the 
run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, staff of these 
organisations have been attacked and criti-
cised for political reasons. 
In 2002, the first Director-General of the 
OPCW, José Bustani, was forced out of 
office by the United States (with the active 
participation of current National Security 
Advisor, John Bolton). Washington feared 
that the work of chemical weapons inspec-
tors would undermine the rationale for the 
Iraq war by putting the threat posed by 
Iraq’s alleged chemical weapons pro-
grammes into context. As recently as July 
2017, the then head of the JIM, Edmond 
Mulet, complained about massive political 
pressure being placed on the inspectors. 
The new decision now shifts the bounda-
ry between technical verification and politi-
cal assessment of facts by giving the Tech-
nical Secretariat the mandate to identify 
those responsible for chemical weapons 
attacks. The task of ‘identification’ goes 
beyond the mere gathering of facts. Thus, 
the OPCW is now more likely to become the 
focus of political conflicts. 
While investigating an alleged chemical 
weapons attack, inspectors were already 
able to include certain information in the 
investigation report, which could, for ex-
SWP Comment 32 
August 2018 
6 
ample, be based on the analysis of samples 
taken and “that might serve to identify the 
origin of any chemical weapons used”. 
However, based on their expanded man-
date, they can now gather information 
specifically intended to identify perpetra-
tors, such as satellite imagery, forensic data 
or operational military analyses. 
The decision to extend its mandate was 
adopted at the end of Director-General 
Ahmet Üzümcü’s term of office. In a key-
note speech held on 25 May 2018 in Lon-
don, Üzümcü argued that there is “nothing 
in the Convention that precludes such a 
role for the Organisation” to identify those 
responsible for chemical weapons attacks. 
Spanish diplomat, Fernando Arias, who 
became head of the OPCW on 25 July 2018, 
will now have to implement the expanded 
mandate. Among other things, he will have 
to lead discussions on reforming the Secre-
tariat so that it can fulfil its new task. It is 
still unclear what new competencies and 
capabilities the inspectors will require in 
order to name the perpetrators of chemical 
weapons deployments, which sources of 
information (including possibly intelligence 
information) they will be allowed to use 
and what budgetary implications the deci-
sion has. 
Political rifts 
Thirdly, the decision adopted on 27 June 
has widened even further the political gap 
between Western states and the United 
States on one side and Russia and its allies 
on the other side, should this be at all pos-
sible. Against the background of political 
rifts between the States Parties, the coming 
debates on a reform of the Technical Secre-
tariat are likely to be heated. A large major-
ity of OPCW members supported the ex-
pansion of the organisation’s mandate. 
But some influential emerging economies, 
including India and South Africa, voted 
against the decision. Russia has announced 
its intention to block implementation of 
the decision and has called into question 
the future of the CWC and OPCW. 
It is, therefore, positive that implementa-
tion of the expanded mandate will initially 
focus on Syria. The issue of a general expan-
sion of the OPCW’s tasks will likely be dis-
cussed at the Fourth CWC Review Confer-
ence scheduled to take place at the end of 
November 2018. 
And for now, the first test of the OPCW’s 
new powers to identify the perpetrators 
appears to have been postponed. At the 
time of the decision, an FFM report on the 
April 2018 chemical weapons attack in 
Douma was pending. There was speculation 
that not only chlorine but also sarin had 
been used in Douma. The FFM stated in its 
preliminary report of 6 July there were 
indications of the possible use of chlorine 
but no evidence of a sarin attack. All other 
things being equal, it is easier to attribute a 
sarin attack than a chlorine attack. 
On 30 June in Amesbury, two more 
British citizens came into contact with 
Novichok. One of the victims died on 8 July 
from exposure to the substance. London 
has, as it did after the Salisbury attack, 
asked the OPCW for technical assistance in 
examining the warfare agent used. How-
ever, the British government will only be 
able to request support from the OPCW’s 
Technical Secretariat in identifying the 
perpetrators after a decision to establish a 
group of experts to carry out such a task 
has been taken at the next Conference of 
States Parties in November 2018. 
The Fourth CWC Review 
Conference 
Representatives of the OPCW States Parties 
will meet to discuss the future of the CWC 
and OPCW at the end of November. The 
regular Conference of the States Parties 
(19–20 November 2018) and the five-yearly 
Review Conference (21-30 November 2018) 
would have been controversial even with-
out the Special Session. However, the deci-
sion adopted on 27 June is likely to further 
reduce the likelihood of a successful review 
conference. 
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States Parties must tackle three chal-
lenges if they want to preserve and strength-
en the prohibition of chemical weapons. 
Firstly, they will need to avert further 
fragmentation of the chemical weapons 
regime. The CWC, opened for signature in 
1993, is the political, legal and normative 
cornerstone of chemical weapons disarma-
ment. It prohibits the development, produc-
tion and use of all toxic substances for non-
peaceful purposes. 
However, as a consequence of the politi-
cal dispute over responsibility for chemical 
weapons attacks in Syria and elsewhere, 
new instruments have been created or pro-
posed which could lead to a disintegration 
of the chemical weapons regime. Alongside 
the IIIM, the UN Human Rights Council 
has also been investigating serious human 
rights violations and crimes against human-
ity since 2011. It has also repeatedly pub-
lished reports on chemical weapons attacks. 
In 2016, Russia proposed a convention 
for the suppression of acts of chemical 
terrorism, apparently in order to distract 
from the Assad regime’s use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. On 23 January 2018, 
France and 23 other, mostly Western states 
launched the International Partnership 
Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical 
Weapons to identify and name those re-
sponsible for chemical weapons attacks. In 
response, Russia proposed a United Nations 
Independent Mechanism of Investigation 
(UNIMI) to assume the tasks of the FFM and 
JIM but failed to garner the necessary sup-
port. 
The CWC States Parties should, therefore, 
declare at the Review Conference that new 
instruments to control chemical weapons 
can only complement the CWC. Compati-
bility with the CWC should be the most 
important yardstick for judging any new 
initiatives to strengthen the ban on chemi-
cal weapons. 
Secondly, the Review Conference will 
provide an opportunity to counteract the 
politicisation and polarisation of the chemi-
cal weapons debate. The permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council play a special 
role in enforcing international norms. They 
bear primary responsibility for re-establish-
ing a global consensus on the chemical 
weapons ban.  
In the long run, it is impossible to sus-
tain and strengthen multilateral institu-
tions without the support of the major 
powers. It is impossible to predict when and 
how the deep political divisions between 
Russia and the West can be overcome. De-
spite their bilateral disagreements, how-
ever, it would be sensible for Moscow and 
Washington to agree on continuing at least 
certain forms of cooperation to control 
weapons of mass destruction. It was ulti-
mately the shared understanding that close 
cooperation provided the only way to pre-
vent Syrian chemical weapons falling into 
the hands of terrorist groups which was the 
basis for the successful Russian-US coopera-
tion on disarmament in 2013 and 2014. 
To some degree at least, it has been 
possible to articulate joint positions on the 
disarmament and non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. For example, 
the United Kingdom, Russia and the United 
States as depositary states and therefore 
guardians of both the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1970 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) did 
issue joint statements ahead of the BWC 
Review Conference in 2017 and on the 
occasion of the NPT’s 50th anniversary. 
A similar statement by permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council and some key 
middle powers, such as Germany, stressing 
the importance of the chemical weapons 
ban and identifying common ground on 
how to strengthen the CWC could possibly 
help make the Review Conference a success. 
Thirdly, more work needs to be done in 
the run-up to the Review Conference to 
advance the OPCW’s central reform pro-
jects. One key question is what should be 
the core of the organisation’s future work. 
Until recently, verification of chemical 
weapons disarmament was the main task 
of the Technical Secretariat. 
Meanwhile, more than 96% of the 
world’s declared 72,000 tons of chemical 
weapons have been destroyed. Of the eight 
states that declared chemical weapon stock-
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piles when joining the CWC, only the 
United States (and presumably Syria) has 
yet to complete destruction. Washington 
plans to achieve this goal by 2023. 
But what efforts should the OPCW under-
take to counter the threat of chemical weap-
ons proliferation? The answer to this ques-
tion is still the subject of much controversy. 
Better Responses to New Threats 
Chemical weapons risks have changed sig-
nificantly in the 25 years since the CWC 
was negotiated. The focus is no longer on 
chemical weapons use by regular armed 
forces in inter-state conflicts, such as during 
the First World War or by Iraq in the war 
against Iran in the 1980s. Today, chemical 
weapons attacks by non-state actors or ter-
rorist use by states, such as happened in 
Syria, appear to be the greater danger. 
The discussion on Syria influences the 
debate on the necessary reform steps de-
scribed here and elsewhere. It would be 
helpful to make this discussion more ob-
jective and return to the more technical 
aspects of chemical weapons control. This 
might increase the odds that participants at 
the Review Conference will be able to lay 
the foundations for more common ground. 
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